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Government Debt Reduction in the Old EU 
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Miklós Losoncz – Csaba G. Tóth
The international financial and economic crisis that started in 2007 and was 
referred to as the Great Recession, and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis, led to 
a significant increase in the government debt ratio (the ratio of gross government 
debt to GDP) in the European Union. This was followed by a gradual and lasting 
consolidation in the old EU Member States (EU15), which had last been seen from 
the mid-1990s onwards and which ended precisely because of the economic crisis. 
In our study, we use a debt decomposition analysis to show the main similarities 
and differences between the debt reduction period in the second half of the 2010s 
and the one that ended with the outbreak of the previous Great Recession. In both 
periods, the government debt ratio declined to a nearly similar extent on an annual 
average in almost two-thirds of the EU15 group of countries. However, in addition 
to this similarity, there were significant differences in the structure of consolidation. 
In the period from the mid-1990s to the 2007–2009 crisis, disciplined fiscal policy, 
in particular, stimulated debt reduction through the primary balance, the effect 
of real GDP growth was offset by the impact of real interest rates and the other 
items did not play a significant role. By contrast, the effect of fiscal policy has been 
much smaller in the debt reduction experienced over the past nearly half a decade, 
whereas the lower level of interest rates and the other items have contributed 
substantially to the consolidation process. The favourable international interest 
rate environment has made fiscal policy complacent. If monetary policy support is 
terminated or weakening, the role of fiscal policy in reducing the government debt 
ratio will become more important again to the EU15 states.
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1. Introduction1
It is not without reason that the nearly one and a half decades that preceded the 
international financial and economic crisis2 of 2007–2009 entered history books 
as the period of the Great Moderation (Bernanke 2004). Compared to previous 
years, the volatility of key macroeconomic indicators decreased significantly and, 
with a few exceptions, the management of the general government of EU Member 
States was also relatively calm. Although there were significant differences between 
individual countries, fiscal consolidations, which began in the 1990s and proved 
more or less effective in improving short-term imbalances, also led to halting and 
reversing the increase in gross government debt relative to GDP (Baldacci et al. 
2014). However, the international financial and economic crisis, which marked the 
beginning of a new era in economic history, suddenly ended the carefree years of 
fiscal policy. This has forced economists and policy makers to reconsider their views 
on fiscal policy (Muraközy 2012). This was necessary, among other things, because 
within a few years the financial crisis and subsequent real economic crisis then 
triggered a sovereign debt crisis in several countries in the EU and the euro area, 
and even elsewhere. Governments of more than half a dozen states were forced to 
seek financial help from various international organisations to meet their payment 
obligations (Tóth 2014, Tóth 2017, Losoncz 2014). The significance of the problem 
we examine is indicated by the fact that even in its 2019 medium-term forecast 
(European Commission 2019), the European Commission found a medium or high 
risk to the sustainability of public finances in almost half of the EU Member States.3
It is thus understandable that – following the Great Recession and the ensuing 
sovereign debt crisis – most European states tried to consolidate their fiscal 
positions by gradually rectifying their imbalances and reducing their debt ratios. 
Due to significant differences in fiscal and cyclical positions, the turnaround did 
not occur simultaneously in all countries, but in 2015 the average debt ratio of 
the EU15 also started to decline, and since then the indicator has been falling year 
after year. This trend has been temporarily interrupted by the Covid-19 pandemic 
that appeared in early 2020 and then became global, or more precisely by the 
restrictions imposed to curb the pandemic and the adverse impact of government 
programmes on equilibria aimed at mitigating the economic downturn. Although 
the uncertainty about the expected, year-end debt ratios is enormous, according to 
the IMF (2020) forecast published in April, gross domestic product in the euro area 
may contract by 7.5 per cent in 2020. This suggests that 2019 most likely marked 
1  We thank the anonymous peer reviewers for their helpful suggestions.
2  According to the official position, the recession in the US began in December 2007 and ended in June 2009, 
i.e. it lasted 18 months. According to the criteria of the International Monetary Fund, there was a global 
economy-wide recession in 2009.
3  For more information on fiscal sustainability, see the works of Burnside (2005), Castro – De Cos (2002), 
Agnello – Souza (2009), Presbitero (2011).
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the end of the five-year period of fiscal consolidation and debt ratio reduction in 
EU15 states. In other words, the period that allowed for the expansion of fiscal 
leeway thanks to favourable cyclical conditions came to an end, and this leeway 
significantly determines each country’s ability to deal with the pandemic and the 
associated economic crisis.
These processes can also be well demonstrated on the basis of specific numbers. In 
the old EU Member States (hereinafter referred to as EU15), the government debt 
ratio rose from 24 to 70 per cent between 1974 and 1996. Thereafter, the indicator 
decreased by almost 15 percentage points by the beginning of the crisis in 2007. 
As a result of the international financial and economic crisis of 2007–2009 and the 
ensuing sovereign debt crises, the EU15 government debt ratio rose again to an 
average of 92 per cent in 2014, before declining anew by almost 10 percentage 
points between 2015 and 2019. In other words, the debt reduction period that 
ended last year cannot be considered unprecedented.
However, the almost similar rate of decline in government debt during the 
two periods may be due to different developments. We examine these in our 
study, seeking answers to the following questions: To what extent are the two 
periods similar and different? What were the driving factors behind the debt 
reduction before the Great Recession? And which factors formed the basis for 
the consolidation carried out in the second half of the 2010s? Comparing the 
two periods is useful and instructive, not only to better understand the economic 
and social contexts behind the fiscal phenomena, but because past experiences 
can provide answers to our questions about current events as well. There has 
been a particularly intense debate among economic policy makers and economic 
professionals4 about the pace and effectiveness of recent debt reductions. Past 
experiences, in turn, can serve as guidance for the future, enriching our knowledge 
with new information and conclusions.
The nature of the study is an international comparative analysis based on statistical 
methods (decomposition of debt dynamics). The 15 old Member States of the 
European Union were included in the comparison. This is because, on the one 
hand, a sample of 15 countries is still relatively easy to handle. On the other hand, 
compliance with the public debt convergence criteria set out in the Maastricht 
Treaty (gross government debt not to exceed 60 per cent of GDP) and fulfilment 
of the enhanced provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact exerted significant 
external pressure on the economic policy and, within that, the fiscal policy of the 
Member States surveyed, particularly in the Economic and Monetary Union. Finally, 
the countries of Central, Eastern and Southern Europe, which joined the EU in 
2004, 2007 and 2013, were excluded from the comparative analysis because in the 
4  See the works of La Torre – Marsiglio (2019) and Bouabdallah et al. (2017).
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1990s most of them were struggling with the consequences of the transition to 
the market economy. This also left its mark on their fiscal policies and government 
debt positions. The scientific novelty of the paper lies in the fact that the recent 
debt reduction period was not analysed in isolation, as the characteristics and 
relationships behind the consolidation are analysed in comparison to an earlier 
period without major disturbances.
After the introduction, we review the possible types of debt reductions and then 
summarise how the government debt ratio developed in the EU15 group of 
countries in the analysed periods. Next, we present the stages and parameters of 
the debt decomposition analysis followed by a detailed presentation of the results. 
The final section contains the summary and conclusions.
2. Possible types of debt reductions
In addition to the redistribution and the allocation function, one of the most 
important tasks of the modern state is to promote economic stability (Musgrave 
1959). As part of this, one of the most significant requirements for fiscal policy is 
to be able to provide fiscal stimulus in crisis situations (such as a demand shortage) 
(Tóth 2010), i.e. to make available external financial sources through the general 
government (Alesina et al. 2008). As this is mostly achieved through government 
borrowing, the traditional view is that fiscal stimuli are generally accompanied by 
an increase in government debt.
This view was refined by De Grauwe – Ji (2019), who – based on the example of 
the EU15 – gave evidence supported by statistical data that in countries where the 
interest rate exceeds the GDP growth rate, the possibilities for fiscal expansion are 
limited due to the rise in the government debt ratio. However, where the interest 
rate is lower than GDP growth, the government debt ratio can be stabilised or 
reduced even with fiscal stimulus. Of course, the starting position, i.e. the initial 
value of the government debt ratio, is also significant: the higher it is, the more 
limited is the space for fiscal easing.
As a general trend, in order for the government to have enough fiscal space for 
indebtedness, if need be, it must be able to reduce the government debt ratio 
between crises, especially during economic recovery. On the one hand, this is 
necessary because if the government does not reduce the debt ratio in the recovery 
phase of the business cycle, then the so-called ratchet effect can easily occur (P. 
Kiss 2012). This means that if the debt ratio rises in crisis, whereas in non-crisis 
periods it simply does not go up further, then indebtedness will continue to mount 
in the long run due to crisis-related increases, threatening the sustainability of the 
general government (Balatoni 2015, Tóth 2011). However, in a dynamically growing 
economy, a tight or more responsible fiscal policy is needed with a gradual reduction 
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of the government debt ratio to create space for fiscal manoeuvre, even in the 
short term. Investor confidence gained in “peacetime” is an essential condition for 
meeting soaring financing needs in a crisis (Ghosh et al. 2013).
Lehmann et al (2020) also pointed out that the conditions for enforcing the 
convergence criteria set out in the Maastricht Treaty have recently become more 
difficult due to the decline in the rate of economic growth and inflation compared 
to the beginning of the 1990s. According to Nagy et al (2020), to stabilise the 60 
per cent government debt ratio, the general government deficit relative to GDP 
should be 1.1 per cent instead of 3 per cent. Lehmann et al (2020) also pointed out 
that EU fiscal rules ignore the equilibrium requirements between major national 
economy sectors (non-bank private sector, government and the rest of the world).
In countries with high government debt values, reducing the government debt ratio 
in the recovery phase of the business cycle is an overall objective, the realisation 
of which significantly reduces the vulnerability of public finances and improves 
the resilience of the economy to the effects of the next economic crisis. There 
are several different ways to reduce the debt ratio, and they can and should be 
categorised in several ways. Based on the economic policy approach of Bernardini 
et al. (2019), we have created groups as follows:
 i.  Improvement in the primary balance. The academic literature generally refers 
to this channel as “orthodox fiscal adjustment” based on tax increases and 
expenditure restraints. The key question in this regard is how such a fiscal 
adjustment will affect economic growth and the level of interest rates and, through 
these two factors, the debt ratio itself. The general experience is that, in the 
short run, the rate of real GDP growth mostly declines due to the demand effect. 
However, the debt-increasing effect of this may be mitigated by fiscal discipline, 
which contributes to a moderation in nominal interest rates by strengthening 
investor confidence (Alesina – Perotti 1995, Alesina – Perotti 1997).
 ii.  Growth effect. Economic growth helps reduce debt through two channels. On 
the one hand, it lowers the debt ratio through the denominator effect. On the 
other hand, a booming economy generates more tax revenues, which also pushes 
down the debt ratio through the primary balance, if the additional revenues are 
not spent by the government but saved. From the point of view of measurement, 
however, it is often difficult to quantify the second effect. This would, namely, 
require accurate knowledge of the impact of economic growth on the budget 
balance, while filtering out the reverse effect. Although there was promising 
research on this (Mauro – Zilinsky 2016), when examining the change in the debt 
ratio, and thus when conducting the debt decomposition analyses as well, usually 
only the effect through the denominator is classified in this category.
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 iii.  Acceleration of inflation. According to mainstream economic theories, in today’s 
practice, raising the money supply is less common but it is a theoretically possible 
way to monetise government debt. The financial theories of recent years 
(endogenous money creation) reject this approach. In this context, we refer to 
an increase in the inflation rate rather than in the money supply (because the 
latter does not necessarily induce the price level to rise). Growth in the price level 
through real interest rates in itself diminishes the debt ratio, but only if there 
is surprise inflation, and only to the extent that the given government relies on 
long-term, fixed-interest loans for financing (Aizenman – Marion 2009). Although 
to a lesser extent, an acceleration in the rate of inflation (or GDP deflator) may 
also help reduce the debt ratio through the denominator effect, because the 
larger the nominal GDP becomes, the smaller the quotient is (Hall – Sargent 
2010).
 iv.  Decline in interest rates. A decline in interest rates, both nominal and real, will 
reduce the debt ratio. In the former case, the interest expenditures constituting 
part of the annual current expenditures of government debt fall. One important 
tool for interest rate reduction is so-called financial repression (Reinhart – Rogoff 
2009, Reinhart 2012). All legal and other administrative instruments aimed at 
cutting the interest rate level of government borrowing can be classified here. 
This may include the maximisation of deposit rates competing with government 
bonds enacted by the regulator, as well as the mandatory prescription to purchase 
a certain amount of government bonds for different insurance undertakings. In 
addition, the interest burden can also be reduced by restructuring government 
debt if a country succeeds in exchanging its government bonds for securities 
with lower interest rates or longer maturities. The last example in Europe was 
in Greece (Győrffy 2014). A similar procedure is so-called mutualisation, which 
has been coined in the European Union typically, aiming to replace market loans 
with funds through the financing by EU institutions. These would raise funds 
from the market at a much lower rate than the market rates, due to the joint 
guarantee. The scheme was first a stopgap solution to manage the sovereign 
debt crisis. It was later put on the agenda in the context of further development 
of the Economic and Monetary Union with the aim of issuing government bonds 
jointly guaranteed by the Member States. Adoption of the proposal is unlikely, 
mainly due to Germany’s opposition.
 v.  Privatisation. One of the classic forms of debt reduction is the sale of state 
property. The key question in this respect is whether the state has assets that can 
be managed more efficiently in private ownership. The effectiveness and impact 
of privatisation measures depend largely on the price at which the transaction 
takes place. In most of the sample countries we analysed, this impact was 
negligible.
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 vi.  Exchange rate effect. Government debt can also be lowered if the exchange rate 
of the domestic currency strengthens. The extent of this mainly depends on 
the amount of foreign currency liabilities within government debt. Through the 
exchange rate effect, not only the value of the debt can be mitigated, as annual 
nominal interest costs can also be lowered at the same time.
3. Evolution of government debt ratios
In this section, we present a detailed overview of the evolution of the government 
debt ratio of the EU15 countries in the period before the Great Recession and in the 
debt reduction period that ended in 2019. The first phase covers the period from 
1997 to 2007 and the second one from 2015 to 2019 (Figure 1). In both cases, the 
first and last year of the decline in the average debt ratio constitute the time frame. 
For each country, the beginning and end of the debt reduction periods may also 
vary related to each phase. As the average government debt ratio rose between 
2008 and 2014, we did not cover this , except of those countries where the second 
debt reduction period started in these years. Thus, during the analysis of each 
countries the first period is the period before the global financial crisis, while the 
second period is the 2010s.
To ensure the comparability of the data, we used the European Commission’s 
AMECO database, both for the descriptive statistics and the subsequent analysis 
of debt dynamics. Most of the data series are available from 1995 and the last year 
taken into account in the calculations is 2019. As actual data for 2019 were not yet 
published at the time of writing the study, we used the latest EU forecast5 available 
for download from the AMECO database.6
In terms of government debt relative to GDP, between 1997 and 2019, the two 
debt reduction periods are separated by a dynamic phase of increase in the debt 
ratio. In the mid-1990s, the average government debt ratio in the country group 
was 70 per cent, which fell from that level to 56 per cent by 2007. During this 
period, there were four countries (Greece, France, Germany and Portugal) with 
increasing government debt ratios. However, the increase typically did not exceed 
10 percentage points even in these states. By contrast, between 1997 and 2007, for 
example, government debt relative to GDP fell by 46 percentage points in Ireland, 
41 percentage points in Belgium and 30 percentage points in both the Netherlands 
and Sweden.
5  As for Denmark, AMECO contains data on debt only from 2000 onwards, and Danish data were not taken 
into account for longer data series aggregated at country group level. However, the debt decomposition 
analysis was, of course, also performed for Denmark in the shorter time series.
6  Date of downloading the data: 9 October 2019
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As a consequence of the international financial and economic crisis and the resulting 
sovereign debt crisis in the euro area, the EU15 government debt ratio rose to 92 
per cent by the end of 2014 and fell from there to 83 per cent at the end of 2019, 
according to the European Commission’s forecast. During this period, the debt ratio 
only rose in France and Italy, but by only a few percentage points. At the same time, 
government debt relative to GDP decreased by 43 percentage points in Ireland, 
19 percentage points in the Netherlands and 17 percentage points in Germany 
between 2015 and 2019.
Although there are many similarities in the dynamics of the debt ratio between 
the countries reviewed, the differences in the level of the indicator are significant 
throughout the period (as well). In the first period, the government debt ratio 
was exceptionally high in three countries – Belgium, Italy and Greece – where 
it exceeded 100 per cent of GDP. As a result of the crisis, the Greek debt ratio 
jumped quickly above 160 per cent and the Italian and Portuguese indicators to 
130 per cent. At the other end of the scale, on the one hand, it is worth highlighting 
Luxembourg, where the government debt ratio was below 25 per cent all along, 
and on the other hand Sweden, which was closest to it, where the value of the 
indicator was still around 70 per cent in the mid-1990s, which in turn has fallen 
below 40 per cent in recent years. 
Giving a bird’s eye view summary of the most important characteristics of the 
two debt reduction periods for the whole group of countries, it can be stated 
Figure 1
Average government debt of the EU15 as a percentage of GDP
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that whereas in the first period of 1997–2007 the average government debt ratio 
dropped by around 1 percentage point on average per year, starting from an average 
of around 70 per cent, in the second period of 2015–2019 it declined from more 
than 90 per cent by nearly two percentage points per annum. In the next section, 
we analyse the components of this.
4. Debt decomposition analysis
4.1. The roadmap of decomposition
For decades, there has been a very significant emphasis in the academic literature 
on identifying the factors influencing changes in government debt and on accurately 
quantifying each effect. Although there has been continuous innovations in terms 
of methodology (see Mauro – Zilinsky 2016), it has been true for a relatively long 
time that most analyses try to estimate the effects using either a VAR model (Hasko 
2007, Cherif – Hasanov 2010, Ábel – Kóbor 2011), or perform the decomposition 
with a so-called debt dynamics analysis (P. Kiss 1999, De Bolle et al. 2006, Hall – 
Sargent 2010).
The advantage of the former method is that in quantifying each effect, it is possible 
to control for all other factors (balance, interest rate, economic growth), and we 
are free to choose which factors we want to analyse in terms of their effects. It is 
important to emphasise that this is an estimation procedure that in itself carries 
considerable uncertainty. A reliable estimate would require a long time series, which 
is often not available.
The debt dynamics analysis we use below is based on accounting equivalences and 
is reproducible because neither the length of the period under review nor other 
circumstances affect the results. In the following, we deduce the decomposition 
of changes in the debt ratio, based on the works of Ra – Rhee (2005) and Escolano 
(2010).
In the debt dynamics analysis, we used the assumption that the development of 
nominal government debt is influenced by the nominal interest rate and the primary 
balance. All other factors (such as the effect of exchange rate changes) can be 
classified in the category of other items. In contrast to inflation, both the nominal 
and the real interest rate are forward-looking, i.e. the debt (change) in period t 
depends (also) on the interest rate in period t–1:
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where Bt is the nominal government debt in period t, it–1 is the nominal interest rate 
of the previous year, PBt is the primary balance and SFAt is the other item (stock-
flow adjustment). As government debt is typically defined as a percentage of gross 
domestic product, we divide both sides by the GDP in period t (Yt):
37
Government Debt Reduction in the Old EU Member States: Is This Time Different?
 
Losoncz-Tóth_tanulm_képletek:		
𝐵𝐵" = 1 + 𝑖𝑖"'( 𝐵𝐵"'( − 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵" + 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆"	 (1)	
𝐵𝐵"
𝑌𝑌"
=
1 + 𝑖𝑖"'( 𝐵𝐵"'(
𝑌𝑌"
−	
𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵"
𝑌𝑌"
+
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆"
𝑌𝑌"
	 (2)	
𝐵𝐵"
𝑌𝑌"
=
1 + 𝑖𝑖"'( 𝐵𝐵"'(
1 + 𝑔𝑔" (1 + 𝜋𝜋")𝑌𝑌"'(
−	
𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵"
𝑌𝑌"
+
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆"
𝑌𝑌"
	 (3)	
𝑐𝑐 =
1 + 𝑖𝑖"'(
1 + 𝑔𝑔" (1 + 𝜋𝜋")
𝑏𝑏"'( − 𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏" + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠"	 (4)	
∆𝑏𝑏" =
1 + 𝑖𝑖"'(
1 + 𝑔𝑔" (1 + 𝜋𝜋")
𝑏𝑏"'( − 𝑏𝑏"'( − 𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏" + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠"	 (5)	
∆𝑏𝑏" =
1 + 𝑖𝑖"'(
1 + 𝑔𝑔" (1 + 𝜋𝜋")
− 1 𝑏𝑏"'( − 𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏" + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠"	 (6)	
∆𝑏𝑏" =
1 + 𝑖𝑖"'(
1 + 𝑔𝑔" (1 + 𝜋𝜋")
−
1 + 𝑔𝑔" (1 + 𝜋𝜋")
1 + 𝑔𝑔" (1 + 𝜋𝜋")
𝑏𝑏"'( − 𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏" + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠"	 (7)	
∆𝑏𝑏" =
1 + 𝑖𝑖"'( − 1 + 𝑔𝑔" (1 + 𝜋𝜋")
1 + 𝑔𝑔" (1 + 𝜋𝜋")
𝑏𝑏"'( − 𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏" + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠"	 (8)	
∆𝑏𝑏" =
𝑖𝑖"'( − 𝑔𝑔" −	𝜋𝜋" − 𝑔𝑔"𝜋𝜋")
1 + 𝑔𝑔" (1 + 𝜋𝜋")
𝑏𝑏"'( − 𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏" + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠"	 (9)	
∆𝑏𝑏" =
−𝑔𝑔"
1 + 𝑔𝑔" (1 + 𝜋𝜋")
𝑏𝑏"'( +
𝑖𝑖"'(
1 + 𝑔𝑔" (1 + 𝜋𝜋")
𝑏𝑏"'( +
−𝜋𝜋"
(1 + 𝜋𝜋")
𝑏𝑏"'(
− 𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏" + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠"	
(10)	
	
 (2)
and we express Yt by means of Yt–1:
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where real growth is gt and inflation is πt.
Indicators relative to GDP are denoted in lower-case letters. Accordingly, the 
government debt is bt, the primary balance is pbt and the other item is sfat.
 
Losoncz-Tóth_tanulm_képletek:		
𝐵𝐵" = 1 + 𝑖𝑖"'( 𝐵𝐵"'( − 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵" + 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆"	 (1)	
𝐵𝐵"
𝑌𝑌"
=
1 + 𝑖𝑖"'( 𝐵𝐵 '(
𝑌𝑌"
−	
𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵"
𝑌𝑌"
+
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆"
𝑌𝑌"
	 (2)	
𝐵𝐵"
𝑌𝑌"
=
1 + 𝑖𝑖"'( 𝐵𝐵"'(
1 + 𝑔𝑔" (1 + 𝜋𝜋")𝑌𝑌"'(
−	
𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵"
𝑌𝑌"
+
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆"
𝑌𝑌"
	 (3)	
𝑐𝑐 =
1 + 𝑖𝑖"'(
1 + 𝑔𝑔" (1 + 𝜋𝜋")
𝑏𝑏"'( − 𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏" + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠"	 (4)	
∆𝑏𝑏" =
1 + 𝑖𝑖"'(
1 + 𝑔𝑔" (1 + 𝜋𝜋")
𝑏𝑏"'( − 𝑏𝑏"'( − 𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏" + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠"	 (5)	
∆𝑏𝑏" =
1 + 𝑖𝑖"'(
1 + 𝑔𝑔" (1 + 𝜋𝜋")
− 1 𝑏𝑏"'( − 𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏" + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠"	 (6)	
∆𝑏𝑏" =
1 + 𝑖𝑖"'(
1 + 𝑔𝑔" (1 + 𝜋𝜋")
−
1 + 𝑔𝑔" (1 + 𝜋𝜋")
1 + 𝑔𝑔" (1 + 𝜋𝜋")
𝑏𝑏"'( − 𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏" + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠"	 (7)	
∆𝑏𝑏" =
1 + 𝑖𝑖"'( − 1 + 𝑔𝑔" (1 + 𝜋𝜋")
1 + 𝑔𝑔" (1 + 𝜋𝜋")
𝑏𝑏"'( − 𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏" + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠"	 (8)	
∆𝑏𝑏" =
𝑖𝑖"'( − 𝑔𝑔" −	𝜋𝜋" − 𝑔𝑔"𝜋𝜋")
1 + 𝑔𝑔" (1 + 𝜋𝜋")
𝑏𝑏"'( − 𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏" + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠"	 (9)	
∆𝑏𝑏" =
−𝑔𝑔"
1 + 𝑔𝑔" (1 + 𝜋𝜋")
𝑏𝑏"'( +
𝑖𝑖"'(
1 + 𝑔𝑔" (1 + 𝜋𝜋")
𝑏𝑏"'( +
−𝜋𝜋"
(1 + 𝜋𝜋")
𝑏𝑏"'(
− 𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏" + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠"	
(10)	
	
 (4)
In the next step, we subtract the t–1th periodic debt ratio from both sides of the 
equation and obtain the change in the debt ratio:
  (5)
  (6)
  (7)
  (8)
  (9)
  (10)
On the right side of equation (10), we can find the decomposition of the change in 
the debt ratio for the following items in the order listed below:
•  real GDP growth,
•  nominal interest rate,
•  inflation rate,
•  primary budget balance,
•  other items (privatisation, exchange rate, etc.)
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In order to be able to interpret the results properly, it is worth drawing attention 
to a few more things. On the one hand, if we add the positive effect of the nominal 
interest rate and the negative effect of inflation, we get the effect of the real interest 
rate. This is important because the dynamic component, or as it is otherwise called, 
the snowball effect, which is the combined effect of the real interest rate and real GDP 
growth, plays a prominent role in the academic literature. The dynamic component 
is important because its sign determines whether the primary balance should show 
a surplus to stabilise the debt ratio, if the sum of the other effects is assumed to be 
zero. In addition, the difference between real GDP growth and the real interest rate 
is very often used to measure the sustainability of debt dynamics (Mellár 2002).
It can also be added to the interpretation of equation (10) that – since this is 
a method based on static accounting equivalences – the effect of the primary 
balance includes the improvement in the balance due to the acceleration of real 
GDP growth and the deterioration due to the slowdown or absence of real GDP 
growth. As to the growth effect, it includes the effects of fiscal demand stimulus and 
demand contraction. In other words, this method can only measure direct effects: 
on the one hand, the extent to which the government increases or decreases the 
debt by a primary deficit or by a primary surplus from year to year, and on the other 
hand, how real GDP growth affects the debt ratio through the denominator. Other 
effects are calculated in accordance with international practice covered by the 
academic literature. This comprises the effects of all factors that are not included 
in the others (privatisation, exchange rate effect, etc.).
4.2. The parameters of the debt decomposition analysis
The objective of the debt dynamics analysis is to identify, based on the presented 
methodology, which of the listed factors has influenced the development of the 
government debt ratio, and to what extent. We did not cover the whole period and 
all the countries, but only the years and countries when and where the government 
debt ratio declined. This means that we defined a pre-crisis and a post-crisis debt 
reduction period, if any, for each country. These debt reduction periods had to 
meet the following conditions:
•  Government debt relative to GDP has been shrinking steadily for at least three 
years.
•  During the debt reduction period, the government debt ratio declines by at least 
0.5 per cent of GDP on average per year.
•  During the debt reduction period, the government debt relative to GDP has fallen 
by at least 3 percentage points.
•  In the debt reduction period, there are at most two years when the debt ratio 
does not decrease, but even then, the rise in the indicator is no greater than 20 
per cent of the contraction that has occurred throughout the period.
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In the first period, 11 of the 15 old EU Member States had a debt reduction phase 
meeting the above conditions. Of the countries under survey, only Greece, Austria, 
Germany and Luxembourg did not meet these criteria.
Table 1
Debt reduction intervals before the global financial crisis
Initial debt 
ratio
Closing debt 
ratio
Change in 
debt ratio
First 
year Last year
Number 
of years
Annual chan-
ge in debt 
ratio
 (GDP %) (GDP %) (GDP %) (GDP %)
Belgium 128.0 87.0 –40.9 1997 2007 11 –3.7
Denmark 49.1 27.3 –21.7 2003 2007 5 –4.3
Ireland 69.9 23.6 –46.2 1997 2006 10 –4.6
Spain 65.6 35.6 –30.0 1997 2007 11 –2.7
France 61.4 58.3 –3.1 1998 2001 4 –0.8
Italy 116.3 99.8 –16.5 1997 2007 11 –1.5
Netherlands 70.7 43.0 –27.7 1997 2007 11 –2.5
Portugal 59.5 50.3 –9.2 1997 2000 4 –2.3
Finland 56.1 32.7 –23.5 1995 2007 13 –1.8
Sweden 70.2 37.7 –32.4 1997 2008 12 –2.7
United Kingdom 44.7 34.3 –10.4 1996 2001 6 –1.7
AVERAGE 72.0 48.2 –23.8 1997 2005 9 –2.6
Source: Based on AMECO data
There were significant differences in all dimensions between debt reduction periods 
in terms of both time sequencing and the extent of debt reduction (Table 1). At 
the beginning of the 11 debt reduction periods of the 11 countries included in the 
analysis, the average government debt ratio was 72.0 per cent, which fell by 23.8 
percentage points to 48.2 per cent on average by the end of the period. The largest 
debt ratio reduction amounted to almost 50 percentage points in Ireland, but it 
also exceeded 40 percentage points in Belgium, whereas the smallest reduction 
totalling 3.1 percentage points took place in France.
Debt reduction started typically before 1998. The only exception was Denmark, 
where it commenced in 2003. Debt reduction typically ended with the introduction 
of the euro beginning in 1998 and with the outbreak of the global financial and 
economic crisis. Prior to the introduction of the euro, the countries concerned met 
the convergence requirement for government debt. After the implementation of 
the Economic and Monetary Union, however, this pressure temporarily eased. The 
government debt reduction period was the longest in Finland, at 13 years, and the 
shortest in Portugal and France, at 4 years, while the average was 9 years.
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In terms of the size of debt reduction per year, Ireland and Denmark were in first 
place with 4.6 and 4.3 percentage points, respectively, followed by France at the 
back of the ranking with 0.8 percentage points (Table 1). In the 11 years of the first 
period, government debt relative to GDP contracted by an average of 2.6 percentage 
points annually.
In the second period, ten countries had a debt reduction period meeting the 
conditions outlined above. Italy, France, Greece, Luxembourg and the United 
Kingdom were the exceptions (Table 2). In the starting year, the average debt ratio 
was 84.8 per cent, which fell by 16.6 percentage points to 68.1 per cent. The best 
performer was Ireland with 58.6 percentage points, Germany was second in the 
ranking with 23.4 percentage points, whereas the smallest debt ratio reduction of 
4.1 percentage points took place in Spain.
Table 2
Debt reduction intervals in the 2010s
Initial debt 
ratio
Closing debt 
ratio
Change in 
debt ratio
First 
year Last year
Number 
of years
Annual chan-
ge in debt 
ratio
 (GDP %) (GDP %) (GDP %) (GDP %)
Belgium 107.5 101.3 –6.2 2015 2019 5 –1.2
Denmark 46.1 33.0 –13.1 2012 2019 8 –1.6
Germany 81.8 58.4 –23.4 2011 2019 9 –2.6
Ireland 119.9 61.3 –58.6 2013 2019 7 –8.4
Spain 100.4 96.3 –4.1 2015 2019 5 –0.8
Netherlands 67.9 49.1 –18.8 2015 2019 5 –3.8
Austria 84.7 69.7 –15.0 2016 2019 4 –3.8
Portugal 130.6 119.5 –11.1 2015 2019 5 –2.2
Finland 63.4 58.3 –5.1 2016 2019 4 –1.3
Sweden 45.5 34.4 –11.1 2015 2019 5 –2.2
AVERAGE 84.8 68.1 –16.6 2014 2019 6 –2.8
Source: Based on AMECO data
Post-crisis debt reduction typically started around 2015, but commenced as early as 
2011 in Germany, while it only began in 2016 in Finland and Austria. The last year 
analysed is 2019, not only because the current figures for this year are likely to no 
longer deviate substantially from the final values, but because Covid-19 pandemic 
will terminate this consolidation period as well. Accordingly, the average length 
of the debt reduction periods was 6 years. Ireland also leads in the one-year debt 
reduction with 8.4 percentage points, followed well behind by the Netherlands and 
Austria with 3.8 percentage points each, whereas Spain finds itself at the back of the 
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ranking with 0.8 percentage points. The average annual debt reduction for the entire 
second period and all debt reduction intervals until 2019 was 2.8 per cent of GDP.
Summarising the above, the most important similarity between the two periods 
is that, on the one hand, in both periods the same number of countries (on the 
order of 10–11) had debt reduction intervals, and on the other hand, the rate of 
average annual debt ratio decline was also similar (2.6 and 2.8 percentage points, 
respectively).
There was no significant difference in the initial level of debt ratios, which averaged 
72 per cent in the first period and 85 per cent in the second one. However, at the 
end of the debt reduction periods, the difference was greater. In light of the similar 
pace of debt reduction, this can be attributed to the different lengths of the two 
periods analysed (9 and 6 years, respectively).
5. Results
5.1. Average effects
In the following, we first provide details as to what extent the listed factors by 
country contributed to debt reduction separately in the two periods analysed, and 
then we compare the two periods on the basis of the relative contribution of each 
factor.
With respect to the first period, it can be generally stated that the driving force 
in debt reduction was exclusively fiscal policy and, within that, fiscal discipline 
(Table 3). Namely, the average debt reduction effect of the primary balance (29.5 
percentage points) exceeded the average debt reduction rate (23.8 percentage 
points). This also holds true for almost two-thirds of the countries individually, but is 
particularly valid for Finland, where the debt-reducing effect of the primary balance 
was almost three times the debt ratio decline. Portugal was the only country where 
the primary deficit raised the debt level even during the debt reduction period. In 
the other countries analysed, fiscal policy not only helped to reduce liabilities but 
led the way in this process as well.
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Table 3
Decomposition of the change in debt ratio as a percentage of GDP before the global 
financial crisis
Change in 
debt
Primary 
balance
Real GDP 
growth
Inflation Nominal 
interest rate
Other items Snowball Real interest 
rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (2)+(3)+(4) (3)+(4)
Belgium –40.9 –55.8 –29.0 –21.3 68.0 –2.8 17.7 46.7
Denmark –21.7 –27.6 –4.0 –3.5 10.4 3.1 2.8 6.9
Ireland –46.2 –36.6 –29.1 –12.3 15.0 16.7 –26.3 2.7
Spain –30.0 –24.6 –21.6 –16.4 29.0 3.6 –9.0 12.7
Italy –16.5 –31.8 –17.4 –25.1 63.9 –6.1 21.4 38.8
Netherlands –27.7 –22.6 –17.4 –12.7 31.9 –6.9 1.8 19.2
Portugal –9.2 1.4 –8.6 –5.3 12.5 –9.1 –1.5 7.1
Finland –23.5 –64.3 –23.2 –9.3 35.0 38.3 2.6 25.8
Sweden –32.4 –44.0 –20.0 –7.7 32.9 6.4 5.2 25.2
United 
Kingdom
–10.4 –12.5 –7.8 –4.7 17.1 –2.4 4.5 12.4
France –3.1 –5.7 –7.5 –2.7 13.2 –0.5 3.0 10.5
AVERAGE –23.8 –29.5 –16.9 –11.0 29.9 3.6 2.0 18.9
Source: Calculations based on AMECO data
Unlike disciplined fiscal policy, the snowball effect did not make a substantial 
contribution to reducing the debt ratio. Regarding the average trends, the debt-
reducing effect of real GDP growth was just offset by the effect of the real interest 
rate. In this respect, however, there are larger differences between the individual 
countries. The snowball effect increased the debt ratio in Italy and Belgium by nearly 
20 percentage points due to high interest rates, while it reduced it by nearly 10 
percentage points in Spain and by nearly 30 percentage points in Ireland. It is true 
for both of the latter countries that the debt-reducing effect of economic growth 
surpassed the average, whereas the debt-increasing effect of the real interest rate 
fell short of it. Like the snowball effect, the other items did not substantially affect 
the debt ratio on average for the countries analysed. Finland and Ireland can be 
mentioned as exceptions, where the government debt ratio rose by 38 and 17 
percentage points, respectively.
As the debt reduction period in each country was different in length, it is also worth 
examining the decomposition per annum (Table 4). This shows that fiscal policy 
supported the debt ratio decline – by more than 5 percentage points per year – in 
Belgium and Denmark, whereas in Portugal the rate of reduction was 0.2 percentage 
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points annually. In the case of Ireland and Belgium, which are at the forefront 
of real GDP growth, the contribution of economic growth was 2.5–3 percentage 
points per year, whereas in Denmark it was only 0.8 percentage points. The real 
interest rate lifted government debt relative to GDP by only 0.3 percentage points 
per annum in Ireland, compared to 4.2 percentage points in Belgium. The other 
items raised the debt ratio by almost 3 percentage points per year in Finland and 
1.7 percentage points per year in Ireland, whereas they reduced it by more than 2 
percentage points in Portugal.
Table 4
Decomposition of the change in debt ratio on an annual average basis, as 
a percentage of GDP, before the global financial crisis
 Change in 
debt
Primary 
balance
Real GDP 
growth
Inflation Nominal 
interest rate
Other items Snowball Real interest 
rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (2)+(3)+(4) (3)+(4)
Belgium –3.7 –5.1 –2.6 –1.9 6.2 –0.3 1.6 4.2
Denmark –4.3 –5.5 –0.8 –0.7 2.1 0.6 0.6 1.4
Ireland –4.6 –3.7 –2.9 –1.2 1.5 1.7 –2.6 0.3
Spain –2.7 –2.2 –2.0 –1.5 2.6 0.3 –0.8 1.2
Italy –1.5 –2.9 –1.6 –2.3 5.8 –0.6 1.9 3.5
Netherlands –2.5 –2.1 –1.6 –1.2 2.9 –0.6 0.2 1.7
Portugal –2.3 0.4 –2.2 –1.3 3.1 –2.3 –0.4 1.8
Finland –1.8 –4.9 –1.8 –0.7 2.7 2.9 0.2 2.0
Sweden –2.7 –3.7 –1.7 –0.6 2.7 0.5 0.4 2.1
United 
Kingdom
–1.7 –2.1 –1.3 –0.8 2.8 –0.4 0.8 2.1
France –0.8 –1.4 –1.9 –0.7 3.3 –0.1 0.8 2.6
AVERAGE –2.7 –3.3 –1.9 –1.2 3.4 0.4 0.2 2.1
Source: Calculations based on AMECO data
We get a different picture by analysing the 10 debt reduction intervals that took 
place in the second period. According to the debt dynamics analysis, just over one-
third of the average debt ratio reduction of 16.6 per cent (6.1 percentage points 
on average) is explained by fiscal policy (Table 5). There is no country where the 
effect of the primary surplus exceeds the overall debt ratio reduction. Fiscal policy 
enhanced the debt ratio in Spain and did not substantially lower it in Ireland and 
Finland.
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Table 5
Decomposition of the change in debt ratio as a percentage of GDP in the 2010s
 Change in 
debt
Primary 
balance
Real GDP 
growth
Inflation Nominal 
interest rate
Other items Snowball Real interest 
rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (2)+(3)+(4) (3)+(4)
Belgium –6.2 –5.1 –7.7 –8.8 15.9 –0.5 –0.6 7.1
Denmark –13.1 –8.6 –5.0 –3.1 11.5 –7.9 3.4 8.4
Germany –23.4 –18.5 –10.8 –8.7 14.0 0.5 –5.4 5.4
Ireland –58.6 –5.4 –47.4 –1.7 11.5 –15.6 –37.6 9.8
Spain –4.1 4.4 –13.9 –3.9 15.4 –6.2 –2.3 11.6
Netherlands –18.8 –7.2 –6.7 –3.7 6.4 –7.6 –3.9 2.8
Austria –15.0 –5.2 –6.8 –5.4 7.9 –5.6 –4.2 2.6
Portugal –11.1 –9.1 –12.8 –5.7 17.0 –0.5 –1.5 11.3
Finland –5.1 –0.3 –5.6 –2.2 3.5 –0.5 –4.4 1.3
Sweden –11.1 –6.3 –5.4 –2.5 1.2 1.9 –6.7 –1.3
AVERAGE –16.6 –6.1 –12.2 –4.6 10.4 –4.2 –6.3 5.9
Source: Calculations based on AMECO data
On average, the snowball effect was almost exactly the same as the fiscal policy 
effect of around 6 percentage points. This means that in this period the debt ratio-
reducing effect of real GDP growth already exceeded the debt ratio-increasing effect 
of the real interest rate. In this respect, the position of Ireland is outstanding, 
because almost two-thirds of the debt ratio reduction can be attributed to the 
dynamic component. This is due to a very significant growth effect. The dynamic 
component was positive only in Denmark, which is related to a higher-than-average 
interest rate effect and a lower-than-average growth effect.
In addition to the primary balance and the snowball effect, the effect of the other 
items cannot be neglected either, as they reduced the debt ratio by an average of 
4.2 percentage points. In this respect, Ireland also leads the list at –15.6 per cent 
(due to the privatisation of financial intermediaries rescued by the state during the 
international financial and economic crisis). In Sweden, however, the other items 
elevated the debt ratio substantially on the whole (mainly due to the exchange rate 
effect, i.e. the exchange rate depreciation of the Swedish krona against the euro).
When analysing debt reductions of the second period, it is also worth decomposing 
the change in debt ratio into years. This allows a more precise comparison of each 
country (Table 6). The comparison shows that in Denmark and Portugal the primary 
balance contributed the most to the decline in government debt ratio, by 2.1 and 
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1.8 percentage points per year, respectively, whereas in Spain fiscal policy raised 
the debt ratio by nearly 1 percentage point on an annual average.
The annual effect of real GDP growth was by far the greatest in Ireland (–6.8 per 
cent), although it was also significant in Spain (–2.8 per cent) and Portugal (–2.6 
per cent). In Denmark, on the other hand, the increase in gross domestic product 
barely reduced the government debt ratio on an annual average.
The debt ratio-increasing effect of the real interest rate was largest in Spain and 
Portugal, totalling 2.3 percentage points per annum. As a result of the negative real 
interest rate, this item reduced the debt ratio in Sweden by 0.3 percentage point 
annually. The other items also supported Ireland the most on an annual average, 
by more than 2 percentage points, whereas in Sweden and Germany these items 
increased the debt ratio slightly each year.
Table 6
Decomposition of the change in debt ratio on an annual average basis, as 
a percentage of GDP, in the 2010s
 Change in 
debt
Primary 
balance
Real GDP 
growth
Inflation Nominal 
interest rate
Other items Snowball Real interest 
rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (2)+(3)+(4) (3)+(4)
Belgium –1.2 –1.0 –1.5 –1.8 3.2 –0.1 –0.1 1.4
Denmark –1.6 –1.1 –0.6 –0.4 1.4 –1.0 0.4 1.0
Germany –2.6 –2.1 –1.2 –1.0 1.6 0.1 –0.6 0.6
Ireland –8.4 –0.8 –6.8 –0.2 1.6 –2.2 –5.4 1.4
Spain –0.8 0.9 –2.8 –0.8 3.1 –1.2 –0.5 2.3
Netherlands –3.8 –1.4 –1.3 –0.7 1.3 –1.5 –0.8 0.6
Austria –3.8 –1.3 –1.7 –1.3 2.0 –1.4 –1.1 0.6
Portugal –2.2 –1.8 –2.6 –1.1 3.4 –0.1 –0.3 2.3
Finland –1.3 –0.1 –1.4 –0.5 0.9 –0.1 –1.1 0.3
Sweden –2.2 –1.3 –1.1 –0.5 0.2 0.4 –1.3 –0.3
AVERAGE –2.9 –1.1 –2.1 –0.8 1.8 –0.7 –1.1 1.0
Source: Calculations based on AMECO data
5.2. Average relative contributions
Compared to the general characteristics, there are much more pronounced 
differences concerning the role of each item in reducing the debt ratio. The most 
significant difference is related to the budget (Figure 2).
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On average, the debt-reducing effect of the primary balance in the first period was 
127 per cent of the total debt reduction, while in the second period it was only 34 
per cent. In addition, all of this was not attributable to only one or two countries 
with outstanding results, but proved to be a general trend. In the first period, only 
one country (Portugal) did not reach the average of the second period, whereas in 
the second period no country approached that of the first one. It is, therefore, no 
exaggeration to conclude that, whereas before the crisis, the sole engine of debt 
reduction was disciplined fiscal policy, the role of the primary balance declined 
radically following the crisis.
In the two periods, the different function of fiscal policy in reducing the debt ratio 
obviously left its mark on other items as well. For example, the snowball effect 
(Figure 3) capturing the combined effect of the real interest rate and real GDP 
growth has the opposite sign in the two periods. In the first period preceding the 
crisis, the average snowball effect was –23 per cent. This means that the debt ratio-
increasing effect of the real interest rate outweighed the opposite effect of real GDP 
growth, and therefore the snowball effect raised the debt. With three exceptions, 
this holds true for all countries. On the other hand, in the second period following 
the crisis, the snowball effect resulted in nearly one-third of the average debt ratio 
reductions. With the exception of one country, the debt ratio-reducing effect of real 
GDP growth was greater than that of the real interest rate everywhere (Figure 3).
Figure 2
Debt-reducing effect of the primary balance compared to total debt reduction
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Note: The horizontal line is the average of the period. A positive value indicates contribution to debt 
reduction, a negative one represents the opposite effect.
Source: Calculations based on AMECO data
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As for the effect of the other items, the difference is smaller compared to the 
above items, but also not negligible (Figure 4). In the first period, the other items 
contributed to the debt ratio reduction by an average of –4 per cent, i.e. their effect 
was practically neutral. In the second period, however, they became a major factor, 
contributing by an average of 32 per cent to the debt ratio reduction, i.e. similarly to 
the primary balance and snowball effects, they accounted for one-third of the debt 
reduction. Within this, the trends are well characterised by the fact that although 
there were differences between the individual states, the effect of the other items 
was positive everywhere, with one exception.
Figure 3
Debt reduction effect of the snowball effect compared to the total debt reduction
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Note: The horizontal line denotes the average of the period. A positive value indicates contribution to 
debt reduction, a negative one represents the opposite effect.
Source: Calculations based on AMECO data
Figure 4
Debt-reducing effect of the other items compared to total debt reduction
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If the average effect of each item is averaged separately each year, then it becomes 
clear to what extent the two debt reduction periods are similar and to what extent 
they differ (Figure 5). Among other things, the basis for the comparison is that 
whereas in the rate of annual debt ratio reduction there is barely a difference, the 
same cannot be said of the contribution of the individual items. In the first period, 
the primary balance reduced the debt ratio by an average of 3 percentage points 
per annum, while in the second period it decreased it by only 1 percentage point.
The snowball effect, before the crisis, lifted the debt ratio by 0.2 percentage point, 
but then, after the crisis it reduced it by 1 percentage point. It is worth emphasising, 
however, that within this there was no significant difference in the effect of real GDP 
growth. This item pushed down government debt relative to GDP by approximately 
2 percentage points in both periods. The difference between dynamic components 
is due to the different effect of the real interest rate, which in turn can be attributed 
to the difference between the nominal interest rate and inflation.
In the first period, the debt-increasing effect of the nominal interest rate was 3.3 
percentage points and the opposite effect of inflation was 1.2 percentage points. 
In the second period, the influence of the nominal interest rate was much smaller 
(1.9 percentage points) and that of inflation was only slightly lower (–0.8 percentage 
Figure 5
Average effect of factors influencing the debt ratio as a percentage of GDP
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point). This means that the effect of the real interest rate was stronger in the first 
period than in the second one, largely due to the influence of inflation which was 
not much greater in the first period than the effect of the nominal interest rate, 
compared to the second period. In other words, the post-crisis debt reduction 
is partly the result of nominal interest rates falling more than the inflation rate, 
and therefore, the debt-increasing effect of the real interest rate was smaller than 
before the crisis. By way of illustration, between 2010 and 2019 the one-year money 
market interest rate in the euro area declined to –0.19 per cent from an annual 
average of 3.92 per cent in 1996–2007.
Our results concerning the structure of debt reduction before the Great Recession 
are broadly in line with an earlier conclusion of the European Commission’s 2010 
publication (European Commission 2010). Although they analysed a shorter period 
(2003–2007) of fiscal policy for the entire euro area, they found that the effect of 
the primary balance was twice as large as the overall debt reduction, which was 
partly offset by the snowball effect and the sum of the other items. Another analysis 
by the organisation (European Commission 2018) also covered the entire euro area, 
but for a shorter period (2015–2018) than our paper. In this, like us, they calculated 
that one-half of the debt reduction implemented in the euro area countries in the 
second half of the 2010s is attributable to the snowball effect, more than one-third 
to the primary balance and nearly one-tenth to the other items.
6. Summary and conclusions
The reduction of the government debt ratio of the EU Member States until 2019, as 
well as its effectiveness and structure, has a significant, long-term effect not only on 
the development of public finances, but on GDP growth as well and, more broadly, 
on the general macroeconomic performance of the countries concerned as well. 
Therefore, it is worthwhile and instructive to learn as much as possible about the 
quality, structure and specific aspects of the reduction in government debt ratios. 
The objective of our analysis was to explore, quantify and evaluate the factors and 
trends behind the reduction in government debt ratios. The research method used 
was a comparative statistical analysis based on the sample of the 15 old Member 
States of the European Union.
It can be highlighted as a common feature of the debt ratio reduction in the first 
period (before the global financial crisis) and the second one (the 2010s) that nearly 
two-thirds of the countries analysed had a period when the government debt ratio 
had contracted by at least 3 percentage points for several years. At the beginning 
of the decline phases, the average initial level of the government debt ratios was 
72 per cent in the first period and 85 per cent in the second period, whereas it 
was 48 and 68 per cent at the end of these two phases. The length of reduction 
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averaged 9 years in the first period, but only 6 years in the second one. As a result, 
the rate of average annual debt ratio reduction was 2.8 percentage points in the first 
period and 2.6 percentage points in the second period, i.e. the pace was practically 
identical.
In our study, we used debt dynamics tools to answer the questions: which factors 
drove the moderation of the debt ratio at a similar rate on an annual average in 
the two periods and whether there were differences between the two apparently 
similar periods in this respect, and if so, what are they. Our main conclusion is that, 
in the first period, debt reduction was driven solely by tight, disciplined (restrictive) 
fiscal policy, whereas the real interest rate and real GDP growth taken together 
lifted the debt ratio slightly and the other factors did not substantially affect it. 
On the other hand, in the second period, the primary balance, the snowball effect 
and the sum of the other items contributed almost equally (one-third each) to the 
reduction in the debt ratio. It is important to point out that the effect of real GDP 
growth was the same in the two periods examined, and therefore the difference 
between snowball effects was due to the different effects of real interest rates. This, 
in turn, can be attributed to the fact that nominal interest rates were much lower 
in the second period than in the first one, whereas no such a difference was found 
between the inflation rates in the two periods.
In summary, it can be stated that in the first period the budget dynamised the 
reduction in the debt ratio, while in the second period the effect of fiscal policy 
weakened significantly, and the role of the lower interest rate level and the other 
items gained in importance. This suggests that in the second period, the reduction 
in the government debt ratio was fuelled more intensively by factors independent 
of fiscal policy, and thus, among other things, it depended heavily on loose 
monetary policy. Supportive monetary policy appears to have rendered fiscal policy 
complacent through low real interest rates. With a change in monetary conditions, 
this questions the long-term sustainability of trends which have gained ground 
in recent years. The role of fiscal policy in eliminating or at least mitigating the 
consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic is also prominent, in contrast to monetary 
policy which is actually overburdened in many respects.
The scientific novelty of our study can be summarised in that we did not discuss 
the factors dynamising the current debt reduction in isolation, but using a debt 
decomposition procedure we made a comparison to an earlier period that in many 
ways was similar to the current one. A further area of research could be mapping, 
by country, the driving forces behind the results we produced. It may be particularly 
instructive to compare the fiscal performance of countries involved in international 
programmes (IMF, EU) to that of a control group of non-programme countries. It 
may also be of interest to analyse the contribution of fiscal policy to economic 
growth (structural reforms, growth-enhancing budget investments, etc.). 
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